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Abstract
The rationale for fiscal rules and institutions has been explained by the existence
of deficit and spending biases that arise due to political fragmentation within gov-
ernment or between governments that alternate in office. In common pool models
fiscal outcomes are determined by the decision-making rule that is used to aggregate
conflicting interests into a single budget and they can affect spending bias. Several
institutional responses are possible for internalizing the overall costs of budgetary
programs. These costs could be internalized by giving a strong mandate to the min-
ister of finance, whose role is to consider the overall effects of policies. This paper
analyses a model in which the minister of finance internalizes the common pool bud-
get’s externality. First, we consider a model where all ministers play simultaneously,
and MF acts as a spending minister. In order to capture the institutional framework,
where MF takes in account the budget equilibrium, we have modelled the interaction
in a sequential way. Under this assumption the minister of finance maximizes his
utility function as a leader. In a sequential equilibrium, leader’s expenditure choice is
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grater than in simultaneous result, while the deficit bias is lower due to agenda setting
power over spending ministers.
Keywords:Common pool, Deficit bias, Efficiency
JEL classifications: E62; H50; H62
1 Introduction
Traditionally, the rationale for fiscal rules and institutions has been explained by the exis-
tence of deficit and spending biases that arise due to political fragmentation within gov-
ernment or between governments that alternate in office. The basic argument is that frag-
mented decision making increases the perspective on concentrated benefits of fiscal deci-
sions for specific groups or during a specific period of time, while dispersing the costs in
the form of general taxation over other groups in society or in time.
Political fragmentation within governments (‘size fragmentation’) - as reflected e.g.
in the number of political parties or spending ministers within the cabinet - and between
governments (‘time fragmentation’) are generally seen as the principal political sources
of fiscal biases. Many studies on the effects of fiscal rules or institutions choose to base
their analysis only one of these concepts. For example, Hallerberg et al. (2007) emphasize
size fragmentation, while Tabellini and Alesina (1990) on deficit bias due to time frag-
mentation. Size fragmentation is expected to influence budgetary outcomes through the
common pool problem. The more fragmented is the system of budgetary decision-making,
the weaker are the incentives for each participant to internalize the full tax burden of its
spending bids so that a suboptimal level of spending results. This argument has been ap-
plied to different settings. The original version of the common pool problem as in Shepsle
and Weingast (1981) highlights geographically dispersed benefits of public spending.
Von Hagen and Harden (1994) model the role played by individual spending minis-
ters, while the argument has also been applied to sub-national governments (e.g. Rodden,
2006); in fact it could be applied to any interest group that benefits from targeted ex-
penditures. These static applications explain expenditure pressures, and not necessarily a
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tendency towards budget deficits. Velasco (1999) shows how the common pool problem
may lead to deficits in the context of a dynamic model. In this model, the common pool of
tax resources expands to future generations while these resources can be used by running
deficits. In the two-period model, the incumbent government can influence policy choices
of its successor through the intertemporal budget constraint: a higher deficit and debt will
need to be repaid in period two.
In common pool models fiscal outcomes are determined, first, by the degree of po-
litical fragmentation and, second, by the decision-making rule that is used to aggregate
conflicting interests into a single budget. The rules according through which the budget is
prepared, approved and carried out - in short the fiscal institutions - may therefore act to
counteract political biases that are rooted in political fragmentation.
Von Hagen (1992) is the first to investigate the impact of budgeting procedures on fiscal
performance in EU countries. The idea is that the common pool problem may manifest
itself during different phases of the budgetary process. When the budget is drafted within
the cabinet, biases may arise due to the fact that spending ministers may recognize the
full benefits of their own specific spending proposals, but fail to internalize the costs for
the tax-paying population at large. During the decision-making procedure on the cabinet
proposals in parliament, individual members of parliament may internalize the interests of
specific constituencies within society but not the costs of their amendment proposals for
society as a whole. Finally, biases may again show up during the implementation phase
of the budget, in the way policy reacts to unforeseen events and the way supplementary
budgets are drafted, decided upon and implemented.
Several institutional responses are possible for internalizing the overall costs of bud-
getary programs. These costs could be internalized by giving a strong mandate to the
minister of finance, whose role is to consider the overall effects of policies. In addition,
fiscal rules may be conducive to fiscal discipline given that they put a constraint on fis-
cal policy outcomes. Moreover, during the parliamentary stage, the role of amendments
powers is expected to matter, especially when these powers are not complemented by the
obligation to find adequate financing for new spending proposals. Finally, during the ex-
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ecution of the budget, the degree of flexibility as reflected for example in spending limits
or no carry over provisions would be expected to play a role.
2 The Common Pool Problem of Budget Process
The idea that a common pool problem is intrinsically rooted in the typical public budget
process can be traced back to the paper by Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981). Fo-
cusing on the parliamentary stage of the budget process, they consider a legislature made
up by representatives with a geographically based constituency and explain why a co-
operative legislature would stand for policies that are Pareto dominated. The legislature
will oversupply those programs that concentrate the benefits in geographically specific
constituency, while spreading their costs across all constituencies through generalized tax-
ation. In other words, each representative will fail to internalize the full cost, in terms of
deployment of the common pool of national tax revenues, of financing expenditure pro-
grams that benefit mainly his constituency. The divergence between real and perceived
costs will be wider, and hence the commons problem more serious, the more fragmented
is the legislation. Taken at its face value, this model explains nothing more than the ten-
dency for a parliamentary determined budget to exhibit a level of expenditure on “pork
barrel”projects higher than it is economically warranted. In fact, the more recent literature
has built on the same basic idea to provide a representation of the government stage of the
budget process and to generate a bias toward excess deficits as well as excess public spend-
ing. One can reasonably replace the geographically based constituency of a representative
in the legislature with the special-interest based constituency of a spending ministry in the
government.
A good example is von Hagen and Harden (1995), who consider a government consist-
ing of n spending ministers. The budget allocates public funds, raised through distorting
taxation, to spending ministers, each of them pursuing its policy target. Collectively, the
cabinet would wish to minimize the divergence between policy targets and actually allo-
cated funds and, at the same time, to minimize the excess burden of taxation.
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The common pool problem arises, as in Weingast et al. (1981), from the fact that each
spending minister takes into account only a share of that excess burden: the portion that
falls on his constituency.
There are two ways of reducing the spending and deficit bias arising from the co-
ordination problem in the budget process: either delegation of authority to a “fiscal en-
trepreneur”(the finance minister) or commitment by the whole government to a set of
binding limits on expenditure allocations collectively negotiated at the beginning of the
budgeting process. The larger the finance minister’s agenda-setting power, the closer the
deficit comes to the collectively optimal outcome. Under the commitment approach, the
multilateral nature of the negotiations on fiscal targets implicitly forces all participants to
consider the full cost in terms of tax burden associated with additional spending.
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) note that both approaches require that the finance
minister is vested with enforcement powers in the implementation phase of the budget
(in short, there is an efficient system of public expenditure control and management), in
order to neutralize the incentive that single spending ministers will have to defect from the
approved budget.
3 Model and results
We consider a two-period model of budgeting in a cabinet government consisting of i =
1; :::;n+1 agents: n spending ministers and the finance minister who is independent from
interest groups (benevolent social planner).
Government expenditures consist of transfer xi to groups i in society. Revenues are
given by taxes levied on all groups of society and borrowing. In the first period borrowing
must be repaid with interest in the second period. We assume that government can borrow
or lend at a fixed real interest rate, r. In the second period, government receives an amount
t2 of nontax revenue1. The resulting intertemporal budget constraint involves a trade-
off between the benefit from paying out more transfers in the first period and the cost of
1By simplicity, we assume that first period tax revenue is equal to zero.
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taxation in second period. As in ([8]), the intertemporal utility function of each spending
ministers is:
U(xt;i) = liY   12
2
å
t=1
d t 1

xt;i  x?t;i
2 midG(T ):
with i= 1; :::;n+1, d is the discount rate, 0< d < 1, xt;i is the level of spending allocated
to minister i and x?t;i is the ideal level of spending from perspective of a single spending
minister. The closer the actual budget is to a player’s ideal budget the higher is the player’s
utility, where closeness is measured by the distance. We assume that x?i = x
?
1;i = x
?
2;i.
Moreover, liY , with 0  li  1, represents the percentage of GDP attached to the
ideal point. In general, each minister i has an ideal point distinct from that of all others.
Several interpretations of ideal points are possible. For instance, for spending ministers in
a coalition government, an ideal point represents the budget size and composition that a
spending minister would like to see performed.
Each mi denotes the share of the excess burden from taxation falling on the minister
i’s constituency, with mi < 1 with mi = 1=(n+1). The excess burden of taxation, i.e. the
cost of taxation, is given by a C2 and convex function:
G(T ) =
1
2
qT 2 (1)
and the marginal cost of taxation increases with the level of taxation with q > 1.
The intertemporal government budget constraint over the two periods is
T (xt;i) = rB1+B2  t2
where Bt =
n+1
å
i=1
xt;i for each period t = 1;2 is the total expenditures in period t, r is the
real interest factor for the government and t2 is the exogenous nontax revenue in second
period.
3.1 Decentralized budget process
We first consider the case in which all the spending ministers maximize their individual
utility function subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, taking the other ministers’
bids as given.
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Spending ministers are left to determine their own budgets and we show that the struc-
ture of the bargaining process within the cabinet affects the size of the budget.
Each minister maximizes his utility function subject to the intertemporal budget con-
straint.
max
xt;i
U(xt;i) = liY   12
2
å
t=1
d t 1
h
xt;i  x?t;i
i2 midG(T )
subject to T (xt;i) = r(x1;1+
n
å
i=1
x1;i)+(x2;1+
n
å
i=1
x2;i)  t2:
Summing up over all agents foc conditions gives the government spending level in
period t = 1 and t = 2, bB1 and bB2 and we obtain the level of taxes in period t = 2 as
bT = (1+ r)B?  t2
1+dq(1+ r2)
(2)
3.2 A Strong Finance Ministry
Hallenberg and al. ([8]) consider three cases: first a single planner with a fixed weight
of taxation in the budget; second, the budgeting decision over the n spending ministers
which in bidding for funds take into account only that part of the excess burden of taxation
levying on their constituency; finally, a delegation model with a strong finance minister
with a weighted utility function. In their analysis, the parameter m plays a central role
in order to capture the size of the common-pool problem. Finance minister’s interest
generally coincide with the general interests. He has the responsibility to coordinate the
formation of the budget and his goal is the size of the budget deficit. Formally, in the
main literature the finance minister will submit proposal for transfers that maximize his
utility function under the constraint that each spending minister obtain sufficient utility,
i.e. finance minister maximizes a weighted utility function. Spending ministers support a
strong finance minister, as they obtain greater utility.
However, given that n  1 spending ministers adhere to strong minister’s budgeting
decision, the n  th minister has incentive to deviate, as he disregard the externality re-
sulting from the common revenue fund and will increase is spending. In this way, the
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finance minister needs, in addition to agenda setting power, an enforcement power to en-
sure his decision holds. In conclusion, Halleberg and al. give an example of enforcement
power as the “control device, like the requirement to obtain authorization for disbursing
public funds during the fiscal year”. In Italy, such instrument in the form of linear cutting
spending power was given to the Dept. of General State Account.
In order to model the interaction between Finance Minister and spending ministers, we
consider a sequential mechanism in which the Finance Minister precommits fiscal policy
and observes the n spending ministers’ optimal choices. This means that Finance Minister
acts as a leader and the n spending ministers as followers.
Leader ministry can commit itself to a spending level that the followers are forced
to take as given when making its own spending decisions. Finance Minister acting first,
will choose a higher level of public spending and will distribute it in favour of spending
ministers at the end of the second period. In such way, (a) we model a benevolent Finance
Minister whose agenda setting power limits the deficit spending bias, and (b) we obtain a
mechanism of power enforcement for the second period.
The timing is the following: in the first stage, Finance Minister chooses his spending
level for both period maximizing his utility function; in the second stage, spending minis-
ters observe Finance Minister choices for each period, and maximize their utility function
simultaneously.
Each spending ministers share the excess of the burden taxation as the parameter
mi = 1n , while Finance Minister’s parameter m measures the common pool externality
and represents the perception of burden taxation. In such way, different from spending
ministers, Finance Minister internalizes the cost of taxation. In the sequential approach,
spending ministers continue to take into account only the portion mi of the cost of taxation
when making the budget bids, while the Finance Minister takes the entire cost of taxation
into account.
3.2.1 Sequential mechanism
Finance Minister’s optimal choices are the solution of the following utility maximization
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max
xt;1
U(xt;1) = liY   12
2
å
t=1
d t 1
h
xt;1  x?t;1
i2 mdG(T )
subject to T (xt;i) = r(x1;1+
n+1
å
i=2
x1;i)+(x2;1+
n+1
å
i=2
x2;i)  t2:
As usual, we solve the problem “in reverse ”. Supposing that Finance Minister is
the leader and spending ministers are the followers, then given leader choices, spending
ministers acting simultaneously want to solve:
max
xt;i
U(xt;i) = liY   12
2
å
t=1
d t 1
h
xt;i  x?t;i
i2 midG(T )
subject to T (xt;i) = r(x1;1+
n
å
i=1
x1;i)+(x2;1+
n
å
i=1
x2;i)  t2:
for all i= 2; :::;n+1.
Summing up over all agents f.o.c. conditions gives the government spending level in
period t = 1 and t = 2, eB1 and eB2 and we obtain the level of taxes in period t = 2 as
eT = (1+ r)B?  t2
1+dqh(1+ r2)
(3)
4 Conclusion
In a completely decentralized budget process, each spending minister bids for and obtains
the funds maximizing their utility given the bids of the others spending ministers. In this
approach also the Finance Minister is a spending minister without any special strategic
power that allow him to coordinate budget decisions. FinanceMinister in bidding for funds
takes into account only that part of excess burden of taxation. In the main literature, is well
known that all ministers disregard the externality resulting from the common revenue fund
and, hence, spend and borrow more than a single benevolent planner would.
In this work, we consider an institutional mechanism to achieve budget decisions that
are closer to the one that is collectively optimal for the government. One member of
the government, i.e. the Finance Minister, has the function to monitor the others using
selective incentives. His interest generally coincide with the general interests and has
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the responsibility to coordinate the formation of the budget. In such way, the size of the
budget deficit is often the principle indicator of his effectiveness. The Finance Minister’s
staff gives him the instruments to monitor the actions of the other ministries. The Finance
Minster’s enforcement and agenda setter powers are strictly linked with the parameter m:
the larger m is, the higher the perception of the common pool problem and the closer the
spending comes to the optimal outcome.
Comparing spending levels in simultaneously and in sequential model, we obtain the
expected result eB  bB> 0 (4)
The greater arem and q , the bigger is the difference in (4). Increasing the marginal cost and
the internalized burden of taxation, the common pool problem as regarded by the Finance
Minister increases. This discussion can be summarized in the results. We consider the total
tax burden in (2) and (3), and being 0 < h < 1, we have that the tax burden in sequential
model is bigger than in simultaneous. A bigger m when Finance Minister internalizes
more tax burden, i.e. he perceives the importance of the common pool problem, implies
a greater value of h and he decides a greater level of taxes levied on the entire society,eT   bT > 0.
Considering optimal spending level of Finance Minister in sequential and simultane-
ous model, we obtain that in decentralized model the optimal choice is smaller than in
sequential. Leader ministry can commit itself to a spending level that the followers are
forced to take as given when making its own spending decisions. Finance Minister acting
first, will choose a higher level of public spending and will distribute it in favour of spend-
ing ministers at the end of the second period. In such way, we have modelled a benevolent
Finance Minister whose agenda setting power limits the deficit spending bias, and we have
obtained a mechanism of power enforcement for the second period.
On the other hand, the results for spending ministers’ optimal choices are:
exi < bxi
for all i= 2; :::;n+1. We obtain a smaller deficit bias related to delegation of decision and
monitoring power to a strong finance minister.
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With these allocations, utility levels for both Finance Minister and spending ministers
are:
eUi > bUi
for all i= 1; :::;n+1. Thus, each spending minister benefits from centralizing the budget
process in a strong Finance Ministry. Our centralized solution yields higher utility for each
spending minister and also for Finance Minister, and it is a Nash equilibrium. This implies
that Finance Ministries have strong enforcement powers to implement their budget. This
result is strongly affected by the value of li. In the simultaneous model li= 0 for all agents
due to homogeneity on players’ preferences. In the sequential model spending ministers
li is close to 0 and li tends to 1 for the MF because only MF fully internalizes the social
welfare given by Y .
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